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Petitioner Prosper, Inc. respectfully submits its reply brief on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PROSPERS REPLY TO THE BOARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The Workforce Appeals Board (hereinafter "Board") in its Brief (hereinafter B. 
at ), states that it "supplements and corrects" Prosper Inc.'s (hereinafter "Prosper") 
Statement of Fact. Prosper responds1 to the Board's supplemental facts as follows: 
• In paragraph 1, the Board, without reference to the record, states "The employer 
provides online classes to customers in a variety of subjects." (B. at 2, paragraph 
2). Prosper does not provide online classes. 
• In paragraph 2, the Board states "When the employer sent information, including 
claimant's email address, to the claimant's students, the employer misspelled the 
claimant's name by using O-N at the end instead of E-N." (B. at 2, paragraph 2). 
The testimony given by Katrina Iversen (hereinafter "Iversen") is that with one 
student her name was spelled O-N instead of E-N. (R. at 102, lines 33-34). The 
Board inaccurately states that the condition applies to "students" rather than a 
single student. 
• In paragraph 3, the Board states that Prosper "believed the claimant was not 
responding to student emails" and that Prosper "believed the claimant was 
missing appointments." (B. at 4, paragraph 3). Iversen by her own testimony 
admits to missing appointments (R. at 101, lines 15-19) and similarly admits that 
1
 The Board's late filing of its Brief does not relieve Prosper of its responsibility to 
correct any inaccuracies in the Board's presentation of the facts. 
1 
her responses to students were at times untimely. (R. at 103, lines 27-33). It is 
inaccurate to state that Prosper "believed" these conditions were occurring. 
• In paragraph 4, the Board states "The claimant had been given approval to work 
from home when she was hired and was later asked not to work from home." (B. 
at 4, paragraph 4). Though not wholly inaccurate, the record reflects that Iversen 
was told not to work from home. (R. at 088, lines 1-4). This requirement was 
confirmed in the disciplinary warning of September 9, 2005. (R. at 007). 
• In paragraph 7, the Board states a hearing was scheduled for "August 7, 2006". 
(B. at 5, paragraph 7). The hearing date was April 11, 2006 (R. at 069). 
• In paragraph 7, the Board states "The employer was sent notice of the hearing 
and an appeals brochure which instructed the employer to contact the witnesses 
and make sure they would be able to participate in the hearing."(B. at 5, 
paragraph 7). This statement is not supported by the record. Though it may be 
standard business practice for the Department of Workforce Services to send 
employers its appeals brochure, there is no reference to the brochure in the 
record. The Board's inclusion of the appeals brochure as Addendum E 
inappropriately augments the record. 
• In paragraph 9, the Board states "The employer did not ask any of the 
complaining students to testify at the appeals hearing before the ALJ . . . ." (B. at 
5, paragraph 9). The Board assumes facts not in evidence. There is nothing in 
the record to substantiate that Prosper did not ask complaining students to testify. 
2 
II. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD MISINTERPRETS THE 
LAW. 
Hypothetical: After a long week at work, Julie is looking forward to dining at 
her favorite restaurant. Upon being seated, she is disappointed to see that the server is 
the same server that waited on her a few weeks ago. She hopes that today the service is 
better. Once again she is disappointed. In fact, if anything, the service is worse. The 
server is chewing gum, he mixes up the orders, and above all, he sneezed on the table. 
Not wanting to make a scene, Julie mentions to the Hostess her dissatisfaction. To her 
surprise, the Hostess responds: "We know his performance is poor, but without direct 
testimony, we cannot terminate him for cause. Would you be willing to testify about 
his performance at his unemployment hearing?" 
Though the preceding hypothetical may not actually occur, the inferences drawn 
therefrom are obvious. If in the example the server had intentionally poured coffee on 
Julie and was terminated for it, then the restaurant may need to rely on direct testimony 
to establish the grounds for termination. By contrast, if the complaint that Julie lodges 
is the ninth customer complaint in the last two months, the restaurant does not need to 
prove the particulars of the complaints only that the complaints are occurring. As the 
restaurant is concerned about protecting its reputation and satisfying customers, it is not 
the specifics of the complaints at issue, but rather, the body of complaints being 
received by the server. 
3 
A. Hearsay Under Evidence Rule 801(c). 
Pursuant to R994-405-202(l)(2005), employers can discharge employees when 
the employee's conduct jeopardizes its rightful interests. In the hypothetical, the 
server's conduct was impacting the restaurant's legitimate interests and reputation. If 
the restaurant doesn't take steps to terminate the server, its reputation and business will 
be negatively impacted. 
Similarly, Iversen's receipt of 40-50% more complaints than other coach was 
impacting Prosper's legitimate business interests. Not only was Prosper concerned 
2
 Jason Coulam testified that Iversen received 40 to 50 percent more complaints than 
any other coach. The Board is critical of this testimony stating that Prosper presented 
no evidence to support its estimate. (B at 18). However, under Rule 701 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, non-experts are able to form opinions that are rationally based on 
perception and helpful about a fact in issue. Additionally, Coulam's estimate was in 
direct response to a question by the ALJ: 
Judge: Okay, and let me ask you this. To your knowledge, did she have 
more complaints than any other coach? 
Coulam: Absolutely. 
Judge: And give me a percentage. Was it ten percent more? I mean-
Coulam: I've been doing this, you know, as I've stated, as a coaching 
director for four years. We have close to 85 coaches that are 
currently employed with us. I would say, as a percentage, you 
know, it's hard to say, but I would say that she received anywhere 
from 40 to 50 percent more complaints than any other coach has. 
As it was the ALJ that solicited the testimony, it was incumbent upon the ALJ as the 
examining party to elicit additional testimony about the estimate if there were concerns 
about its accuracy or admissibility. 
4 
about resolving the specific customer complaints, but Prosper was also concerned about 
protecting its image and reputation. (R. at 079, lines 17-27). In terminating Iversen, 
Prosper properly relied on the occurrence of complaints without having to prove the 
particulars of each complaint. 
Under Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 801(c), out of court statements are 
admissible as non-hearsay. If evidence is offered to establish the existence of a fact, 
then such evidence can be admitted as not hearsay. In State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332 
(1993), Olsen argued that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of two UPS 
employees. The Court stated: 
We conclude that the court correctly allowed the testimony of the UPS 
employees because the statements allegedly made by Nichols were offered for 
purposes other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The testimony was 
introduced to prove that the statements and inquiries were in fact made. It was 
also admitted to show that Nichols and Powell were at the site of the robbery 
under unusual circumstances and that Nichols acted in an unusual manner prior 
to the robbery. Therefore, these statements were not hearsay and were properly 
admitted at trial. Id at 335. 
See also cases cited in footnote 3. 
3
 State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1987)(officer's testimony regarding a 
conversation with informant was not hearsay because it was admitted to explain the 
police officer's conduct); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1985)(bank 
reconciliation and agency records admitted to show their condition and contents); State 
ex rel G.Y. v. State, 962 P.2d 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(statements admitted to explain 
actions taken in performing duties as caseworker); State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996)(out of court statements to be admitted to explain actions); Provo City v. 
Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 365-66 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(out of court statements was 
admitted to explain a police officer's belief of exigent circumstances); Lay ton City v. 
Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(officer's testimony regarding a 
conversation he had with a store clerk to be admitted to explain the police officer's 
conduct); Durfey v. Board of Educ., 604 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah 1979)(employment 
offered admitted to evidence good faith, not as proof of the substance of the offer). 
5 
A review of the records leads to the inescapable conclusion that Prosper was 
concerned about the number of complaints Iversen was receiving.4 (R. at 007). The 
record does not establish that any one particular complaint formed the basis of the 
separation. It was the totality of the complaints that Iversen was receiving that led to 
her termination. Prosper presented evidence of nine customer complaints received by 
Iversen after September 9, 2005. (R. at 081, lines 7-8). The existence of the complaints 
is not disputed. Iversen admitted under oath that the complaints were about her. (R. at 
102, lines 4-8). Though Iversen sought to introduce a variety of explanations why the 
complaints were happening, the complaints occurred at a rate of 40%-50% more than 
any other coach. The Board argues that reliance on the existence of the complaints as 
grounds for termination is "disingenuous" (B. at 11). However, Prosper provided non-
hearsay evidence of the complaints to establish its state of mind in deciding that it 
needed to discharge Iversen in order to protect its legitimate business interests. Under 
Rule 801(c) the existence of the complaints is admissible evidence. As such, the Board 
erred in not admitting the evidence of the customer complaints. 
4
 Just as the existence of the customer complaints led to Iversen's written disciplinary 
warning, it was the existence of the customer complaints that formed the basis for her 
termination. 
5
 There was no testimony that more was expected from Iversen than other coaches. 
Other coaches had students transferred to them. Other coaches managed their schedules 
and juggled time zones. All the coaches had essentially the same possibility of 
receiving complaints. Yet Iversen's received 40 to 50 percent more complaints than 
others coaches. 
6 
B. Protection of Due Process Rights. 
Though the Board raises the issue that admitting customer complaints as non-
hearsay under 801(c) would violate Iversen's due process rights, this Court has 
addressed the issue previously. 
In State ex rel G.Y. v. State, 962 P.2d 78, 85-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) a mother 
lost custody of her children when they were adjudicated to be neglected. Appealing the 
trial court findings, the mother argued that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay 
evidence through a caseworker with the Division of Child and Family Services 
("DCFS'n). The mother challenged the caseworker's testimony because it referred to 
out-of-court statements contained in reports received by DCFS, but prepared by others. 
After affirming the trial court's ruling that as the testimony was admissible as not 
hearsay under 801(c), this Court went on to hold that in circumstance where testimony 
is presented for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted, parties are 
not denied their due process rights by admitting such testimony: 
Appellant also contends that the trial court violated her right to due process by 
denying her the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
Because Farr (the DCFS caseworker) had no personal knowledge of the 
substance of the reports, appellant argues that she was deprived of any 
meaningful cross-examination of those who prepared the reports and the contents 
of those reports. . . . However, we determined that the out-of-court statements 
introduced through Farr's testimony were not hearsay. Because the out-of-court 
statements were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, appellant was 
not denied any opportunity to confront or cross-examine the declarant. In this 
circumstance, Farr was the declarant, testifying to her own actions, and her 
statements were subjected to appellant's cross-examination, (emphasis added). 
In this case, Iversen had the right to confront and cross-examine Prosper's 
witnesses regarding the existence of the complaints. If the complaints had been 
7 
fabricated, Iversen could have uncovered such inaccuracies. However, Iversen's due 
process rights regarding the testimony presented was protected. To hold otherwise 
would misdirect the cross-examination from the existence of the fact, to the truth of the 
fact. Because the evidence was presented to establish Prosper's state of mind in 
terminating Iversen, Iversen's due process rights were protected. The Board's concerns 
that Iversen's due process rights would be violated by admitting such evidence is 
misplaced. 
C. Hearsay Under Evidence Rule 803(6). 
Even if this Court finds the existence of the customer complaints is not 
admissible under 801(c), the existence of the complaints should have been admitted 
under Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The record establishes that Iversen received a number of complaints against her. 
(R. at 081, lines7-8). The Board affirmed in its Brief that the complaints were 
documented in the regular course of the business. (B. at 4, paragraph 3). The records 
were made at or close to the time of the occurrence of the complaints. Id. The integrity 
of the record was preserved in Customer Management System ("CMS").6 Iversen 
admitted that her interaction with students was tracked in CMS. (R. at 108, lines 27-31). 
6
 In its Brief, the Board supplements the facts stating that Prosper did not have any of its 
Student Care employees testify at the hearing. (B. at 5). It also criticizes Prosper for 
failing to provide any witness that did talk with the dissatisfied students. (B. at 6,). 
This argument, however, is a red herring. Had the Student Care employees testified at 
the hearing, the Board would have similarly argued that the testimony was inadmissible 
hearsay. 
8 
There is no indication that the record lacked trustworthiness. Iversen did not challenge 
the accuracy of the CMS record. 
In State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court found that 
records made in the ordinary course of business at or near the time of the occurrence of 
the event carries a presumption of trustworthiness. Though the Board asserts that the 
records lack trustworthiness, the Board inaccurately focuses its attention on the 
complainants and not the record. (B. at 11). 
Additionally, the Board suggests that Bertul excludes the existence of the 
customer complaints. However, the language quoted in its Brief (B. at 10) in fact 
supports admissibility. In Bertul, the Court stated that records of routine matters "such 
as the day a crime was reported" are admissible. Id. at 1184. Therefore, Prosper's CMS 
records that contain evidence "such as the day a customer complaint is made" are also 
admissible. 
Because the Workforce Appeals Board failed to consider the evidence of 
customer complaints, the ALJ and Board misapplied the business records exception to 
the hearsay rule under Rule 803(6). The ALJ and Board decision to exclude the 
evidence of customer complaints is a reversible error. 
7
 Alternatively, pursuant to Administrative Rule R994-508-109(9)(2005) "Oral or 
written evidence of any nature, whether or not conforming to the rules of evidence, may 
be accepted and will be given its proper weight." Therefore, whether under Rule 
801(c), Rule 803(6), or R994-508-109(9), the evidence of customer complaints should 
have been admitted and considered. However, the record establishes that the ALJ and 
Board deemed all Prosper's evidence inadmissible hearsay. 
9 
D. The Residuum Rule. 
Each time the Department of Workforce Services has considered the Iversen 
matter, it has cited to Mayes v. Department of Employment Sec., 754 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), for the proposition that the residuum rule prevents the admissibility of 
Prosper's evidence. A review of the facts confirms that the residuum rule does not 
apply in this case. 
It is well established that hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative 
hearings. See Utah Admin. Rules, R994-508-109(9)(2005). The checks and balances 
imposed on Administrative Agencies to offset the unfettered introduction of hearsay 
evidence is the residuum rule. The residuum rule requires that the findings of facts are 
not based exclusively on hearsay evidence. Mayes v. Department of Employment Sec, 
754 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In this case, however, even if Prosper's testimony and documentary evidence is 
deemed exclusively hearsay, Iversen made admissions against interest as to the customer 
complaints against her. Such testimony is admissible non-hearsay under Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2).8 Iversen herself testified: 
Judge: Okay, ma'am? I'm the one that makes the decisions. The 
employer has testified that these were complaints about you-are 
you saying that these complaints are not complaints about you? 
Claimant: I would say that the majority of the are-
Judge: Okay. (R. at 102, lines 4-10). 
8
 Statements are not hearsay if "The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the 
party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity. . . ." Utah R. 
ofEvid., Rule 801(d)(2)(A). 
10 
Similarly on the issue of working from home: 
Judge: work from home? Now, Mr. Coulam has indicated that he told 
you, specifically, you could no longer work from home. Is that 
correct? 
Claimant: I did not agree. 
Judge: Well, you don't get to choose. If your employer tells you you don't 
get to work from home any more-that's not something that you can 
agree to or not agree to. I'm asking you-
Claimant: (Unintelligible one or two words). 
Judge: I'm asking you, ma'am-did he tell you that you could no longer 
work from home? In that meeting? 
Claimant: He asked me to move all of my sessions to Prosper, yes. 
Judge: Okay, so you knew that they wanted you to work from the office? 
Claimant: I knew that they asked me to work from the office. (R. at 100, lines 
16-38). 
In Wagstaff v. Department of Employment Sec, 826 P.2d 1069 (Utah App. 1992), 
this Court specifically considered the residuum rule and admissions against interest. 
Mr. Wagstaff was an Air Force civilian employee who was discharged for drug use. He 
challenged the decision denying him unemployment benefits asserting he was not 
terminated for just cause. In evaluating the claim, the Commission made a factual 
finding that Wagstaff had used cocaine during his lunch break. The report contained 
Wagstaff s own admission as well as co-workers1 statements. In affirming the denial of 
unemployment benefits, this Court held that the admission by Wagstaff was sufficient to 
satisfy the residuum rule. Id. at 1072, citing Rule 801(d)(2). 
11 
Similarly, in Hoskings v. Industrial Comm 'n.9 918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
this Court citing WagstaffWiih approval stated: "This court held that the Commission's 
finding of a single incident of drug use was supported by the employee's own 
admissions, and thus was supported by a residuum of competent, non-hearsay 
evidence." Id. at 155 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, Iversen herself admitted under oath that the complaints were 
about her. (R. at 102, lines 4-10). She also admitted that she had been told not to work 
from home. (R. at 100, lines 16-38). As in Wagstaff, Iversen5s own admissions are 
sufficient non-hearsay evidence under Rule 801(d)(2) to satisfy the residuum rule and 
support her termination. It was reversible error for the Board to exclude Prosper's 
evidence on Iversen's customer complaints and award unemployment compensation 
benefits. 
III. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD WAS ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE IN RULING THAT PROSPER 
DID NOT ESTABLISH JUST CAUSE FOR DISCHARGING IVERSEN 
FOR ATTENDANCE VIOLATIONS. 
The Board in "supplementing and correcting" Prosper's Statement of Fact the 
Board states: 
6. The employer terminated the claimant's employment on February 23, 2006. 
She was terminated for poor job performance and for working from home. (R, 
86:25-27). ...(B.at4). 
If the Board in supplementing and correcting Prosper's facts affirms that Iversen 
was terminated "for working from home," then Iversen should have been denied 
unemployment benefits. Though the Board will argue that Prosper would not have 
12 
terminated Iversen for working from home had her performance been acceptable, there 
is sufficient direct testimony from Peterson, Coulam and Hardy that her performance 
was not acceptable. (R. at 077, lines 17-20; 086, lines 25-40; 093, line 16). Even if all 
evidence of customer complaints is excluded, Prosper provided substantial evidence that 
Iversen was terminated for "working from home without approval." (R. at 005; 
Peterson, R. at 077, lines 15-20; Coulam, R. at 086 lines 19-27; and Hardy, R. at 093, 
lines 8-16). The Board has presented no convincing reason why it did not find that 
Iversen was properly terminated for just cause for attendance violations alone. The 
Board's decision on the issue of attendance violations must be reversed as being 
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. 
IV. PROSPER'S CHALLENGE OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DOES 
NOT REQUIRE MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
In Part III of its Brief, the Board argues that Prosper failed to marshal evidence in 
support of the Board's decision.9 Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires that a party challenging a fact finding, to marshal the evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. 
In this case, it is the conclusions of law that are at issue. It is the conclusion of 
law that Prosper's testimony and documentary evidence was exclusively hearsay that led 
9
 The Board confuses Prosper's burden of proof, with an appellant's obligation to 
marshal evidence under 24(a)(9). For example, in its heading the Board states "The 
Employer Failed to Marshal the Evidence is Support of its Appeal"; and in the first 
paragraph the Board states 'The court should reject the employer's appeal for its failure 
to marshal the evidence in support of its conclusion..." (B. at 21). 
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to the erroneous finding that "She [Iversen] was responding to student communications 
promptly and was not missing appointment." (R. at 22). Therefore, correcting the 
erroneous conclusion of law will lead to the correction of the erroneous findings of 
fact.10 
However, in order to fully satisfy any marshaling obligation it might have, 
Prosper will address the only two Findings of Facts it would challenge. First, Prosper 
would challenge the ALJ's finding that "the claimant was not unprofessional." (R. at 
22). As Prosper did not assert that Iversen was terminated for being "unprofessional", 
Prosper is unaware of any specific fact that supports the finding. Therefore, there is no 
evidence to marshal in support of the finding.11 
The second finding of fact that Prosper would challenge is the finding that "She 
[Iversen] was responding to student communications promptly and was not missing 
appointment." (R. at 22). The testimony that could be marshaled to supports this 
finding is testimony provided by Iversen: 
Judge: Had they talked to you about missing appointments? 
Claimant: They had talked to be about specific clients-if a call came in or a 
client said that I had missed a session-it was-Lorin would ask me 
why I missed a session, or if I missed a session. 
10
 Rule 24(a)(9) requires a party challenging a finding of fact to marshal the evidence 
that supports the challenged finding. In this case, Prosper cannot effectively challenge 
any findings of fact without first correcting the conclusions of law. Otherwise, it is in 
the untenable position of challenging the ALJ's findings of fact by citing to evidence 
deemed by the ALJ and Board to be inadmissible. 
11
 The only reference Prosper is aware of regarding Iversen being unprofessional is 
found in a student complaint about Iversen. (R. at 078-079, lines 41-43, 1-2). 
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Judge: Uh-huh, and did you miss a lot of sessions? 
Claimant: No, I did not. 
Judge: Did you miss a session with Tim Clark? 
Claimant: No, I did not. (R. at 101, lines 15-27). 
And as it relates to communication with students: 
Judge: Okay, were you responding within 24 hours to all of your email? 
Claimant: As much as possible, yes. 
Judge: What would keep you from responding within 24 hours? 
Claimant: Weekends. Midnight. Uh, over booking, over scheduling. (R. at 
103, lines 27-33). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals 
Board's decision affirming the Administrative Law Judge's award of unemployment 
benefits to Iversen. This Court should find that Iversen was terminated for just cause. 
DATED this of December, 2006. 
Daniel J. Anderson 
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner 
Prosper, Inc. 
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